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‘CLOSING THE BOOKS’1: THE GENEALOGY OF 





Drawing from secondary literature and three years of fieldwork in various post-
conflict societies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, this article revisits the 
conceptual development of a term ‘Transitional Justice (TJ)’ in order to illuminate 
the political construction and deconstruction of TJ in international politics. Major 
patterns and themes  are identified within the international thought and practice of 
TJ to unravel its potentials and pitfalls, with the aim  to emphasise the difficulty in 
‘defining justice’ in war-torn societies. TJ mechanisms are explored which indicate 
more culpability for perpetrators and compensation for victims in the midst of 
authoritarianism and civil wars across the globe. There is an immediate pragmatic 
need to move beyond rigid and thick legal positivist traditions and going beyond 
romanticising ‘liberal’ values that TJ represent in arriving at an epistemological 
understanding about TJ. As such, and drawing from poststructuralist intellectual 
strands in International Relations, this article illuminates the unstable binary 
distinction between the idea that both law and politics represents in ‘defining’ TJ.   
Keywords: transitional justice, post-conflict societies, transitional politics, critical 





The past twenty years have seen the emergence and proliferation of Transitional Justice (TJ) 
mechanisms, which promised culpability for perpetrators and compensation for victims in the 
wake of authoritarianism and civil wars across the globe (Boraine 2006; Teitel 2000). TJ efforts 
may include (but are not limited to), criminal tribunals, truth commissions, lustrations, 
institutional reforms, public memorials, reparations, and amnesties.3 In this article, I will first 
explore the three genealogical developments of TJ in international thought and practice. 
Understanding these three development is crucial  as part of the international determinism that 
has endured since the end of the Cold War in order to address the issue of post-conflict justice or 
TJ.4 Second, I will discuss major potentials and pitfalls provided by the development of TJ, with 
the aim to highlight the difficulty in defining justice in the midst of conflict and post-conflict 
societies; by explaining the increasing both legal and political concerns of the international 
society in building peace through law, of what is popularly depicted by a renowned international 
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political historians, John Elster (2004), as ‘closing the book’ or ‘coming to terms with the past 
injustice’. In the conclusion, I highlight the idea of bringing politics back5 in order to suggest that 
we should move beyond a rigid legal positivist tradition or liberal values that TJ represents in 
arriving at our epistemological understanding about TJ in highly diverse world politics.6 The aim 
is to highlight the danger in ignoring the elements of power relations in TJ theory and practice.7 
 
Three Genealogical Developments in Transitional Justice (TJ) 
At the outset, it is reasonable for readers to question the expediency of pursuing academic 
exercises that supposedly highlight the developments in Transitional Justice (TJ). Rather than 
dismissing it as mere academic contemplation removed from everyday practical concerns, I 
believe that the analytical discussion proposed here helps to improve policymaker’s 
understanding on the major ideas and historical events that shape the intellectual traditions and 
foundations of TJ and its polygonal features which are crucial to understanding the 
intensifications of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and other regional 
bodies with its rudimentary features in legal human rights and humanitarian machineries, 
including the European Union (EU), Africa Union (AU), Associations of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and so forth.8 In return, the proliferation of these institutions and its human rights 
machineries consolidated the TJ mechanism in war-torn societies since the 1990s (Drumbl 
2007:15-36). 
While numerous scholars9 have debated the modern origins of the term, a few scholars like 
Ruti Teitel (2000), John Elster (2006), Priscilla Hayner (2011), and Baxter (2009) blend their 
interdisciplinary research, expertise, and their legal activism for the last twenty years in attempts 
to highlight the significance of TJ as an academic discipline as well as an international practice. 
Legal historians and political commentators like William Schabas (2006; 2009; 2014) and Katryn 
Sikkink (2001; 2011) describe the writings of Teitel on TJ for example, as ‘very significant’ because 
her works have shaped the contemporary international understanding of the term ‘transitional 
justice’.  
In this article, I borrow the term ‘genealogy’ used by Ruti Teitel (2005; 2004; 2008) in order 
to explain the modern intellectual tapestry that conditioned the inception of TJ since the end of 
World War Two, especially with the birth of the UN system, in particular, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) and the later formed International Criminal Court (ICC).10 The ICC is primarily 
responsible for enacting the legal and political enforcement of the TJ. Teitel borrowed the term 
‘genealogy’ from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (2003) in order to illuminate the 
intellectual development of the field. TJ was largely conditioned by major international historical 
events that took place since 1945. Arguably, such international historical developments 
conditioned the understanding of TJ, both as an academic discipline, as well as an international 
crusade to secure greater international political awareness on criminal justice at the global level 
through international law and institutions, especially in the recent decades for addressing 
atrocities or appalling crimes emanated from war-torn societies.11 
Accordingly, there are three major focal points of TJ which Teitel (2000) coined the ‘three 
genealogical developments’ that shaped the modern understanding and practice of TJ in more 
recent post-conflict reconstruction policies under the banner of the UN. It can be divided into 
three separate (but interrelated) periods. The first period is that which covers the post-World War 
Two years, which prioritised retributive justice and punishment for the crimes of genocide and 
the worst form of human rights violations, as well as systematic violence committed by  political 
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leaders through the state system (Teitel 2000:70). The genesis of this can be traced back to the war 
crime tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo respectively, where, for the first time, responsibility for 
large-scale or mass atrocities was attributed to political perpetrators (individual accountability) 
rather than sovereign states (collective accountability) (Teitel 2008:1-4). The beginning of the 
second development was marked by what Samuel Huntington12 termed the ‘third’ or ‘late wave’ 
of democratisation at the end of the 1980s, following the demise of the Soviet Union and of 
authoritarian rules in various parts of Latin America (Teitel 2000:15-67). A third and more 
contemporary period of TJ was officially marked by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
through the ratification and enforcement of the Rome Statute between 1998 and 2003. As the 
world’s first permanent court, the Preamble of the Rome Statute clearly state that the overall 
mandates of the ICC lay in its unique legal and political functions of investigating and 
prosecuting crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes of aggression (war crimes), and 
crimes emanated from international terrorism (McCarthy 2009: 250-68). Additionally, and apart 
from the ICC, other types of interim international tribunals have operated in former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone that reveals the increased demand for international legal norms to be 
integrated into peacebuilding missions. The 2004 UN Report on the Rules of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies has arguably ‘neologized’ the international liberal 
peacebuilding agenda in terms of not only addressing the political complexity of building peace 
after conflict, but also the legal complexity of war-torn societies by building peace through law or 
TJ mechanisms (see United Nations 2004). 
In debating the modern origins of TJ, scholars like Teitel and Priscilla Hayner concluded 
three major approaches currently subject to critical discussions among the UN policymakers 
(Teitel 2008; Hayner 2011; Olsen et al. 2010a). Firstly, the ‘maximalist’ approach emphasises the 
necessity of criminal prosecution, tribunals, and punishment through the philosophical function 
of retributive justice as a form of deterrence (the basic function of criminal justice) (Olsen et al. 
2010a:13-45). Secondly, the ‘minimalist’ approach is concerned with the political environment of 
post-conflict justice, and calls for the incorporation of amnesty as a political compromise in 
replacing the basic function of retributive justice with an alternative (restorative) form of justice, 
in which non-legal mechanisms like the truth commission are more relevant and effective in 
dealing with mass atrocities (Olsen et al. 2010b:804-5). Finally, the ‘pragmatic’ approach calls for a 
balance between and combination of both retributive and restorative justice (Lessa et al. 2014:85-
6). The current precedents of TJ operations in Sierra Leone, Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Timor Leste, 
and Cambodia reflect the third approach.  
In debating the effectiveness of administration of justice since the UN peacekeeping 
missions in former Yugoslavia (1992), Cambodia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Timor Leste (1999), and 
Sierra Leone (2000), arguably, the strong demand for accountability instead of amnesty have 
triggered the birth of the ICC, and marked the return to predominant themes of the retributive 
justice measures adopted in the first genealogical period (Buckley-Zistel et al. 2014). 
Commentators like Lutz Ellen and Kathryn Sikkink have coined the phrase ‘justice cascade’ to 
refer to instances where advocates of the third genealogical period, inaugurated by the inception 
of the ICC, harbour normative legal criticisms of the weakness of previous measures identified 
and widely adopted in the other two genealogical periods (Tietel 2000; 645-659). These include 
the inability of the post-conflict regime to cope with intra-state conflict (mostly civil wars) and 
poor judicial capacity of the post-conflict regimes, and an increase in peacebuilding missions in 
Africa and Asia. 
In addition to the above genealogical periods highlighted by Teitel, recent research by 
Lauren Balasco (2013:119) also mapped TJ in three more accurate functions and periods of 
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development in world politics since 1945. In the first period of post-1945, although the idea of TJ 
had existed before the 1945 war crime tribunal and the 1980 truth commission waves, the concept 
only entered common usage in the language of policy recommendation following the growing 
international concern over the systematic violation of human rights and the unstable democratic 
processes of developing countries. Hence, this period saw a normative exploration of TJ as part of 
the currency of international relations, especially in the subject of human rights and comparative 
politics of developing countries (Balasco 2013: 200) 
The second wave was concerned with the growth of TJ enterprises and their functions as 
some of the TJ options and mechanisms were afforded to African countries (Balasco 2013:201). 
Borrowing from Latin America’s experiments, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) opted for amnesty and restorative justice.13 By the middle of the 1990s, the 
growing popularity of using criminal and legal languages of prosecution and sanction led to the 
installation of hybrid tribunals, and later the tribunal in Rwanda, Balkan, and Sierra Leone. 
Simultaneously, there was a call for hybridity and more comprehensive approaches, which lead 
to a growth in comparative studies evaluating the nature and viability of justice mechanisms in 
war-torn societies, especially the broader impact of such mechanisms on development, 
democratisation, and peacebuilding (Mutua 2015:1-9). As a consequence of such developments in 
theory and practice of TJ, this introduced more difficult research themes on the scope of 
transition, the types of mechanisms employed, cultural resonance, clashes between values and 
interests, the relevance of the case study being examined and the measures that could plausibly 
be used for international intervention, and other purposes that are not necessarily related to TJ 
(Merwe et al. 2009:1-12). The ambiguity of its goals, the external factors that limit the effectiveness 
of TJ mechanisms, and the broader form of justice that it encompasses (ranging from retributive 
justice and prosecution-based justice to restorative and amnesty-based justice) have challenged 
the relevance of the field of TJ (Garcia-Godos and Sriram 2013:12-23). For instance, the debate 
about the most suitable mechanism with which to deal with past atrocities as part of the liberal 
peacebuilding agenda has ventured into dangerous terrain, in which TJ is recognised as a 
permissible form of justice despite being indeterminate in forming a realistic strategy for post-
conflict reconstruction (Brown 2013:238-40).  
In sum, the recent growing research in critical peace studies and, conflict, security, and 
development have all explicitly and implicitly shaped the polygonal or multifaceted features of 
present TJ practices (see also Vandeginste and Sriram 2011). Finally, the current wave of TJ 
follows the relatively recent trend of incorporating methodological concerns about data 
collection, single or large case studies and the merits of quantitative or qualitative approaches to 
the field. Despite the growth in the literature of TJ, evidence to this date has failed to produce a 
single standard of international measurement, owing to the old debate concerning merits of 
positivist versus critical approaches at the epistemological and methodological levels (Olsen et al. 
2010a:78-84). 
As a result of the above discussion on the genealogical developments of TJ, the field faces a 
disciplinary crisis in academic debate and a paradox of success in actual international practice, 
“The less effective its mechanisms seems to be in their efforts to build democracy and peace, the 
more we are demanding from them” (Balasco 2013:198). In theory, the critical challenges it has 
received are concerning the boundary that it shares with older disciplines (such as history, 
comparative politics, international relations, democracy, human rights, peacebuilding, and 
international development). TJ has come under pressure from policymakers who demand that it 
expand its scope and the increased claims of scholars of the aforementioned disciplines that it 
must identify itself with a particular field (Balasco 2013:199). Additionally, as I have argued14, in 
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practice, the genealogical developments of the field provide a unique view of justice during the 
regime transition in post-conflict societies. However, the danger of viewing TJ in this way lies in 
the agents’ tendency to manipulate human rights (see also Azman 2014a). Once the situation of 
justice considerations in post-conflict societies can be characterised as being beyond straight 
forward understanding of justice, the deep, normative commitment to the language of human 
rights, democracy, and peace reduces TJ to a strategic toolkit or an instrument that is up for grabs 
for any powerful actor or peace-spoiler that wishes to wage war, prosecute enemies, or 
manipulate victims. In a nutshell, three major developments in TJ have provided more significant 
potentials and pitfalls in the way TJ has been understood in international thought and practice. 
Defining ‘Justice’ in the Midst of Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies 
In reviewing the literature on TJ, it can be argued that the two major philosophical strands of 
justice (retribution and restoration) can be connected to the two popular TJ mechanisms widely 
adopted by various post-conflict societies in signifying a transition from war to immediate peace, 
namely the war crime tribunal and the truth commission. While the actual function and operation 
of these two major TJ mechanisms are highly diverse and contested, understanding the essential 
ideas of retributive and restorative justice that underpin these two mechanisms have provided a 
very comprehensive, yet expansive definition of justice, especially in the midst of conflict and 
post-conflict societies (Sriram 2007 and 2010; Ross and Sriram 2012). However, in general, they 
share a deeper affinity with political liberalism (See Wall 2015; Arenhövel 2008). The UN and 
other experts in the field of TJ, have long, albeit implicitly, defined the end goal of TJ operations 
as being the cultivation of some form of liberal democracy (Mindzie 2010:128).  
Additional to the liberal peace tenets, the broadly understood ‘positive peace’ provided by 
Johan Galtung (1969) and extended by the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali’s Agenda 
for Peace (1992), employs a wide range of political and legal mechanisms in its attempts to nurture 
democracy and to prevent the recurrence of violence. Such a hybrid approach to sustaining peace 
and democracy has been proven not to be the most immediate means of securing a transition to a 
credible democracy, as exemplified by the recent protracted transitions of Tunisia. Egypt, Libya, 
and the Ivory Coast (Fisher and Stewart 2014; Volpi 2013). It is within this paradox of success that 
TJ mechanisms are designed specifically with the aim of guiding the transition of these nations 
from post-conflict societies into functional democracies.  
While the three genealogical developments of TJ highlighted earlier illuminates the actual 
administration of justice mechanisms, constructing a broader and more normative definition of 
the objectives of TJ remains problematic due to the continued disagreements among the 
international policymakers and commentators as to whether justice should be viewed as a means 
or as an end (Fourlas 2015:115). The idea of having TJ institutions is strongly connected to the 
normative assumptions that the post-conflict society needs to ‘close the book’ or confront the past 
in order to move forward. As such, direct amnesties hinder criminal prosecutions and providing 
absolute pardon for the appalling crimes are no longer politically and legally acceptable (Hansen 
2014:105-6). As a result of these liberal cosmopolitan persuasions concerning justice, I have 
observed during my fieldwork in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Liberia, South Africa, Brazil, Canada, Japan, 
and former Yugoslavia that researchers’ and policymakers’ conception of TJ as the idea of coming 
to terms with past crimes provides them with political and legal opportunities to handle 
transition and address violence in a way that is based on the relatively similar analogy of 
peculiarity from cases like the Nuremberg trial or Rwandan genocide, which were believed to 
transcend the domain of domestic human affairs (Azman 2014a:364-7). The glorification of a 
‘before-and-after narrative of change’ – a particularity of the TJ experiments in all those countries 
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– confirms the international teleological view of justice (both in the midst of conflict and post-
conflict societies), in that it is generally believed that after each of the political crises that have 
occurred in those countries, they will necessarily find itself in a better situation, especially if those 
crises are addressed through TJ mechanisms (see Arenndt 1969). This also suggests that such a 
teleological approach to justice in world politics can be loosely connected to John Rawl’s Theory of 
Justice (1971:.510) where he states that: 
 
What justifies as a conception of justice is not its being true to an order 
antecedent and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding 
of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realisations that, given our history 
and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine 
to us. 
 
However, few have normatively and analytically investigated whether the Ralwsian 
assumptions of justice (shared by advocates of the liberal traditions in politics and international 
relations) can be easily accepted to promote the liberal cosmopolitan teleology of TJ when such 
mechanisms are conditional institutions constructed to achieve ‘normal’ political transition or 
progress. As such, Kora Andrieu (2014:.85) confirmed that while ‘liberal’ policymakers and 
commentators have cited John Rawl’s writings – which has controversially inspired Francis 
Fukuyama’s perverse views of liberal democracy as marking the End Of History (Fukuyama 1993) 
– in order to convince others that liberalism is a dominant institutional ideology of the UN 
(especially the ICC), few have made empirical investigations to the contrary, such as the fact that 
the Libyan National Transitional Council opted for Islamic law in the post-Gadhafi constitution. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in Egypt’s first election and the renewed post-colonial 
sentiments in rejection of the ICC jurisdictions in various parts of African post-conflict societies 
have become a powerful indicator that challenge the normative argument concerning the idea of 
post-Cold War justice based on liberal political institutions in international thought and practice 
of TJ (Lang 2010; Wiener et al. 2012; Lang and Williams 2005). Hence, the process of defining 
justice by observing various TJ experiments across the globe and the international predisposition 
to normalising the rules of law through ICC have confirmed Anthony Lang Jr.’s (2008) 
observation of international justice and punishment in post-Cold War politics as not only 
negating the Ralwsian principles of political liberalism, but also the current predominant punitive 
nature of international justice that hinders the construction of a just and peaceful order (though 
often receiving their justification through liberal norms) since they do not exist within a just 
political order nor are they based on the UN Charter. This leads to ironic results when those 
major Western powers concerted their brute efforts (through sanctions and military 
interventions) in preaching against rampant corruptions among the Global South states while 
exhibiting aggressive unjust behaviours themselves. The idea of ‘increased judicialisation’ in 
world politics is marked by selective prosecutions and inconsistent stances of Western partners in 
cherry-picking the atrocities while they remain silent over the colonial genocides and crimes of 
aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq (Cameron 2012; Dedring 2008; Lowe et al. 2008). 
In such instances, rather than romanticising the legal positivist features or the liberal values 
that TJ represents, perhaps Christian Bell’s innovative approach in defining TJ may lead to a 
greater recognition of politics in the debate surrounding the definition of TJ, thus providing a 
more fruitful understanding of its ambiguous roles (Bell 2008). Bell argues that as a field of 
theory, TJ was informed by the competition between various normative ideas; for instance, the 
debate between peace and justice, international and national politics, retribution and restoration 
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justice, and law and politic (Bell 2000:15). Simultaneously, however, as a form of policy of 
intervention, TJ enforces a dominant narrative of liberal peace. It offers a westernised notion of 
justice and a one-size-fits-all package for justice and reconciliation-seeking policy for most crises 
that have occurred in non-western societies (Bell 2008:48) Even in countries that are 
geographically located within the European domain (such as the conflicts in Balkan and Northern 
Ireland), the TJ prescriptions issued by external actors (especially by the UN) have not been easily 
accepted by the locals (Bell 2009:8-9). Having emerged in the 1990s, by 2001 the field had become 
more distinct. A liberal cosmopolitan approach began to be adopted, which provided a normative 
language for human rights, human security and humanitarian intervention with which to pursue 
justice and to apply transitional politics (Bell 2009:9-10). However, the normative justification for 
human rights and humanitarian laws are not impartial, and does not address the substantive 
issue of which type of justice (retributive or restorative) should be implemented, and who to 
decide on its execution. 
As such, “TJ does not constitute a coherent field but rather a label of cloak that aims to 
rationalise a set of diverse bargains in relation to the past as an integrated endeavour” (Crook 
and Short 2014:299-315). Bell (2009) identified these diverse bargains as belonging to three distinct 
projects Firstly, continuing the struggle against impunity, wherein TJ is understood as being a 
legal measure for addressing violations of human rights. Secondly, introducing a set of conflict 
resolution techniques that involve the formulation of justice measures as a means of pressuring 
conflicting parties (peace spoilers) to return to the negotiation table. Finally, creating a 
standardised instrument for intervention under the multi-layered cloaks of international state 
building, human security and responsibility to protect. Although these diverse bargains are 
distinct from each other, they appear together as one package, as transitional justice discourse is 
created with the help of international assistance in dealing with regime changes. By romanticising 
the nature of transitional politics, the new post-conflict regime that emerges during the 
transitional phase perceives these diverse bargains or projects as tools (in the form of TJ) with 
which to elicit recognition of their legitimacy and gain assistance (in the form of liberal 
peacebuilding) from the international society (Sriram 2007, Sriram 2006, Richmond 2005). By 
adopting a particular TJ mechanism, the new ruling elite that emerges after conflict invokes the 
authority of transitional norms as a way of communicating to the international society that they 
intend to uphold human rights laws and other international principles (Bell et al. 2004:315). 
Through the adoption of TJ mechanisms, the post-conflict elite reinvents itself as a new regime 
entity, and convinces the international society that it is committed to upholding liberal 
democratic values, political reforms, and good governance (Azman 2014a and 2014b). As such, 
the entire operations of TJ through interventions in the aftermath of political crisis turns the 
legalistic nature of TJ into a discussion about power relations (Thomson and Nagy 2011:.28-29). 
Conclusion: ‘Bringing Back the Politics’ in TJ 
The heavy reliance upon international support among post-conflict elites during the process of 
implementing TJ reveals the features of top-down power relations which effects the long-term 
functions of TJ (Thomson 2011; Clark 2010; Clark 2011). As such, TJ should be viewed as a process 
of negotiation, and an attempt to legitimise new forms of power relations and political order 
(Azman 2014b: 36). TJ is not an objective process, and is never legally executed in response to past 
atrocities committed during the violent conflict episodes (see Azman 2014a). Rather, it is a means 
in negotiating a complex political scenario, which cannot be summarised vaguely as a moral 
conflict between good and evil. To set it alongside Friedrich Nietzsche’s maxim of ‘beyond good 
and evil’, TJ should not be approached as a dogmatic scheme laden with values and morals, as it 
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is envisaged by liberal cosmopolitanism. In On the Genealogy of Morals (2008), Nietzsche criticises 
the personification of societal morals based on the monolithic allegories of good for the strong 
and bad for weak (see also Magnus and Higgins 1999). To romanticise the rule of law in the 
liberal sense is to neglect the essential characters of power and to depoliticise TJ is to repeat 
international peacebuilding’s mistake of negotiating transitional space through the empty vessel 
of the state (Richmond 2011:15). The ethnographical research of Susan Thomson (2013) in 
Rwanda, Claire Moon (2006) in South Africa, Tim Kelsall (2009) in Sierra Leone, Tim Allen (2006) 
in Uganda, and Oliver Richmond (2007) in Cambodia have provided a more specific location in 
visualising power relations or configurations in TJ placements in post-conflict societies. Drawing 
from Michel Foucault (1984, 1977, 1980 and 1997a), they all illuminated power configuration that 
conditioned the TJ operations and activities. Any attempt to exclude power relations from TJ 
results in the implementation of justice institutions alien to these post-conflict societies. These 
scholars confirmed TJ mechanisms as being products of hierarchical power relations, enacting 
legitimacy, and structured by the existing patronage system as methods of historical exploitations 
used by those in power. 
For that, the liberal cosmopolitan projections of TJ fail to acknowledge the position of TJ 
within a constellation of power relations. TJ is not only concerned with addressing past abuses of 
power, but is also part of the political process of enacting a new power relation through a new 
state crafted from the international peacebuilding project. Of particular relevance here is 
Foucault’s commentary on Carl von Clausewitz’s famous argument, “power is war, a war 
continued by other means” (1997a:61). TJ is the personification of this phrase, in that its 
mechanisms must recognise and, “uphold the disequilibrium of forces that [were] displayed in 
war” (Foucault 1997b:14). The significance of interpreting TJ as a form of power relations or 
configurations is crucial in bringing back the politics in defining TJ. In this respect and as I have 
suggested elsewhere (Azman 2014a, 2014b), the pursuit of TJ through various recent liberal 
peacebuilding projects reveal the complexity of restoring security, law, and order after war is 
heavily conditioned by politics. Building peace through TJ divulges the fascinating intricacy 
between law and politics. The research by Hazel Cameron (2012:75-8) in post-genocide Rwanda 
concludes that an understanding of politics as the act of manipulation by the international and 
local elite is not immediately obvious to the casual observer. Such a tacit understanding of power 
relations results in creation of the circumstances in which the ability to perform the immediate 
task of human rights through TJ institutions is highly influenced by the geostrategic and 
economic interest of the West and the newly created post-conflict ruling elite (Vinjamuri 2012; 
Subotic 2012; Brown and Sriram 2012; Vandeginste and Sriram 2011). This should serve as a 
reminder that pursuing justice in the midst of conflict and post-conflict societies is more about 
politics rather than a simple legal exercise, suggesting any future research on TJ must justify a 
departure for the existing theoretical and heavily legal analysis in favour of a more political and 
contextual reading of TJ that considers the national peculiarity of the TJ case study.
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